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Summary findings
Parallel exchange-rate markets have often been dismissed  Then they investigate the fiscal impact of the parallel
by authorities as a nuisance or as the domain of a small  exchange-rate premium, an issue emphasized in the
group of economic saboteurs. Using Tanzania as a case  literature on exchange-rate unification. They construct a
study, Kaufmann and O'Connell argue instead that these  counterfactual simulation of fiscal and balance-of-
markets played a central macroeconomic role in the  payments flows under alternative assumptions about the
1970s and  1980s. They provide a rigorous  indexing of those flows to the parallel and official
macroeconomic analysis of the parallel foreign-exchange  exchange rate. They find that a more aggressive move
market and its fiscal implications.  toward exchange-rate unification would have already
First, they investigate the evolution of that market in  delivered a fiscal bonus by the mid-1980s. Accordingly,
Tanzania from the mid-1960s to 1990. That period  unification of the exchange rate would have reduced
stretched from the adoption of exchange controls to  monetary growth and inflationary pressures.
macroeconomic collapse and then to subsequent reforms  So, contrary to conventional advice often given in
in the mid- to late 1980s. A reduced-form  econometric  Africa and elsewhere, the case of Tanzania suggests that
equation  (of a Dornbusch stock-flow model type)  from a fiscal viewpoint there was no economic rationale
indicates that both trade and financial portfolio factors  for gradualism in exchange-rate unification and delay of
were important in determining the parallel premium,  a move toward convertibility.
with trade determinants dominating in the long run, as
theory suggests.
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At independence,  Tanzania  operated  a relatively  open trade and payments  regime
supported by conservative  monetary  and fiscal  policies. These policies  survived the
introduction  of the Tanzanian  shilling in 1965, but the Arusha Declaration  of 1967 generated  a
fundamental  reorientation  under the rubric of self-reliance  and African socialism.  In the two
decades following  the Arusha  Declaration,  the exchange  rate in Tanzania's illegal  parallel
foreign exchange  market rose at a rate of nearly  2.5 percent per month, more than three times
as rapidly as the official exchange  rate. By early 1986, the parallel rate exceeded  the official
rate by more than 800 percent.-
Trade and exchange rate reforms  formed  the centerpiece  of the 1986  Economic
Recovery Program and its successors,  with the result that the country  moved gradually  but
determinedly  over the next 8 years towards a unified foreign  exchange  market. By early 1990,
the premium had fallen to roughly 50 percent. In early 1992, the Government  introduced
foreign exchange  bureaus, allowing  these entities  to transact  in foreign exchange  at freely
determined  exchange  rates for current account  transactions.  The spread between  the parallel
market rate and the bureau rate quickly  narrowed to below 10 percent, and over the
subsequent  year the spread between  the official  exchange  rate and the bureau rate gradually
fell, reaching roughly 10 percent in mid-1993.  During 1993 the Government  liberalized  nearly
all remaining restrictions  on foreign  exchange  transactions  for current account  purposes, and
late in that year the official and bureau markets were officially  unified. At the time of writing
(early 1995), a vestigial  parallel market remains, with a small premium reflecting  the operation
of residual capital controls, the financing  of illegal  activities, and tax evasion.
This paper focuses on the development  and evolution  of the parallel foreign exchange
market in Tanzania  during its "heyday",  in the period from 1967  to 1990. While parallel
foreign exchange  markets are common  in developing  countries, the Tanzanian  case is
particularly interesting  given the size and persistence  of its premium. We use the Tanzanian
case to shed light on issues that are important  not only for Tanzania  but also for other
countries with extensive  exchange  controls. 2 The first half of the paper characterizes  the
macroeconomic  sources and consequences  of the parallel market  both during its long
expansion  and in the subsequent  move towards convertibility  on the current account. While the
parallel market was variously  dismissed  by the policy authorities  as a nuisance  or as the
domain of a small group of economic  saboteurs,  we argue instead that it played a central
macroeconomic  role throughout  most of the 1970s  and 1980s, and that the dynamics  of the
parallel exchange  rate followed  those of the free rate in a well-functioning  dual exchange
market. The second half of the paper then focuses  particularly on the fiscal implications  of
exchange rate unification.
The paper is organized  as follows. Section 2 provides  an overview  of macroeconomic
developments  from 1967 to 1990, focusing  particularly  on the external sector and the parallel
foreign exchange  market. In Section  3, we specify  and estimate  an empirical model  for the
parallel premium. The empirical  results.  indicate  that portfolio  determinants  have an important2
influence  on the premium in the short run and that trade balance  determinants  are dominant in
the longer run. We extend the basic model  by endogenizing  the real exchange  rate and find
limited evidence  of a long-run effect  of aid flows, the terms of trade, and other determinants  of
the trade balance. A further extension  leads to the somewhat  paradoxical  theoretical
presumption  that Tanzania's own-funds  scheme  implemented  in 1984 should have raised the
premium; the empirical  results provide some  support for this view.
Section  4 takes up the more narrow question  of the fiscal effect of the premium. Our
main concern here is to assess  ihe possibility,  raised by Pinto (1989,1991), that exchange  rate
unification may require a simultaneous  fiscal contraction  in order to avoid an increase in
money growth and inflation. We generalize  Pinto's theoretical  analysis and provide estimates
that suggest that the opposite  was true for Tanzania:  for much of the sample, and particularly
beginning in the late 1980s, more aggressive  moves  towards unification  would have provided a
fiscal bonus and a reduction in inflation.
Section  5 concludes  the paper.
2.  Emergence and growth of the parallel market,  1967-903
Foreign exchange  black markets arise in response  to restrictions  on the convertibility  of
domestic  assets into foreign  exchange. Although  such restrictions  may be imposed  with
microeconomic  goals in mind (such as a reduction of luxury imports), they become important
at the macroeconomic  level when used as a mechanism  to offset sustained  pressure on the
balance of payments. In Tanzania,  balance  of payments  pressures first emerged in the early
1970s, in response  to capital flight and expansion  of the public sector. The situation was
exacerbated  by a combination  of drought  and the first OPEC oil shock in 1974-75.  Figure 1
shows the official  exchange  rate and the parallel  premium from 1970 to 1990.
Exchange  controls, which had been in place since the introduction  of the Tanzanian
Shilling in 1965, were tightened  in response  to the 1970-71  balance of payments "mini-crisis"
and supplemented  by the introduction  of an administrative  scheme for the allocation  of foreign
exchange (Green, Rwegasira and Van Arkadie  (1980)).4  They were then tightened  further in
response to the more severe crisis in 1974-75.  The external situation  was dramatically
improved  by the arrival of the coffee  boom in 1976, but by this time the parallel premium was
over 200 percent.
The foreign exchange  inflows associated  with the coffee boom helped reduce the
premium to 100  percent by the end of 1977, but the Government  chose to use the windfall to
initiate the Basic Industrial  Strategy (BIS), a major public investment  program whose
introduction  had been deferred in response  to the 1974-75  crisis. Increases  in public sector
spending  under the BIS at least partially offset  the reduction in monetary financing  that might
otherwise have accompanied  the coffee  boom. The presence  of an underlying  balance of3
payments  disequilibrium  was dramatically  revealed in 1978 when the Government  loosened
import controls in response to its comfortable  reserves position (see Figure 2). Reserves fell
by 63 percent in 1978, to less than a month of imports (roughly  the crisis level before the
coffee boom), and controls were re-imposed.
Figure  1:  Parallel  Premium  and  Official  Exchange  Rate,  1970-1990
(End-of-Quarter  Data)
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The war with Idi Amin  began in late 1978. Government  expenditures  roughly doubled
in 1979 as a share of GDP, to nearly 20 percent. The accompanying  compression  of parastatal
and private sector imports helped initiate a period of macroeconomic  collapse (Bevan, et al
(1989,1990)).  The premium  rose rapidly, exceeding  200 percent between 1981 and 1984; the
devaluation  of 1984  brought it down only momentarily, and it reached 800 percent at the time
of adoption  of the crawling  peg exchange  rate regime and a major structural adjustment
program in early 1986.
In retrospect, it is clear that a key missing  element in the Tanzanian policy package up
to the mid-1980s  was exchange  rate adjustment.  A bias against devaluation  had emerged in
Tanzania as early as 1967, when the Government  decided  not to follow the 14.3 percent
devaluation  of sterling. Arguments  were based on the belief that import and export volumes
would respond only weakly to changes  in the real exchange  rate; a devaluation  was therefore
unlikely to improve  the external balance. Compounding  this elasticity pessimism  was the view
that a nominal  devaluation  would in any case lead to a general increase in wages and prices,
undercutting  any desired real devaluation.  Finally, opponents  of devaluation argued that capital
flight was motivated  primarily by fears of expropriation  rather than by exchange  rate
expectations;  and the Bank of Tanzania  viewed existing exchange controls as sufficient  to4
contain any speculative  pressure that might emerge in the immediate  aftermath  of the sterling
devaluation. 5
The decision not to devalue in the face of balance of payments  pressures led inexorably
to the need for direct balance of payments  controls and increasingly  severe convertibility
restrictions. These restrictions  enabled the authorities  to maintain an increasingly  overvalued
real exchange  rate, as indicated  in Figure 2. An important  side effect of this overvaluation  was
to exacerbate  the secular decline in exports that had begun as early as the collapse  in world
sisal markets in the late 1960s. The decline in measured, or official, exports shown in Figure 2
was even more dramatic than the decline in export production, since it was the joint effect of
deteriorating  incentives  for export production (e.g., the worsening real exchange rate for
exports) and an increasing  incentive,  embodied in the rising parallel premium, to divert export
proceeds away from official channels.
Figure  2:  Trade  V olum  es  and  Real  Official  Exchange  Rate,  1971-1990
Trade  Volum  e  Index
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The steady decline  of official export revenues, punctuated  only briefly by the coffee
boom, meant a steady tightening of import restrictions, the results of which are apparent in the
declining  import volume in Figure 3. Since price controls had been imposed in 1974, the
response to import compression  beginning in the mid 1970s  was a combination  of limited
increases in official prices and increased reliance on direct rationing of goods. Shortages  of
intermediate  imports and of both imported and domestically  produced consumer goods, which
began to emerge in the 1974-75  crisis only to subside during the coffee boom and subsequent5
import liberalization, re-emerged strongly  beginning in 1979. Shortages  of consumer  goods
were particularly severe in rural areas, where they led to a reduction  in peasant labor supply,
leading to further declines in export production in a vicious  circle of output decline  and
declining availability  of goods (cf. Bevan, et al (1989,1990),  O'Connell (1993)).
The import compression  of the late 1970s  was insufficient  to prevent the emergence  of
arrears in 1978 and the onset of an increasingly  difficult  confrontation  between Tanzania  and
its external creditors and donors over the issue of devaluation  and macroeconomic  adjustment. 6
Aid flows fell in the early 1986s, further contributing  to the cycle of import compression  and
output reduction. The collapse of the early 1980s  began to be reversed only with the reforms
of 1984, which included a 36% devaluation,  removal  of price controls on a number  of goods,
and implementation  of an "own-funds"  import license scheme. Under the own-funds  (OF)
scheme, individuals  with access to their own foreign exchange  were granted import licenses
without having to purchase the corresponding  amount of official foreign  exchange. By
divorcing  the Government's import licensing  function from its foreign exchange  allocation
function, this amounted to a legalization  of what would  previously  have been import
smuggling. Moreover, goods imported through the OF window, some of which still carried
controlled prices if purchased from official sources, could be sold at market-clearing  prices.
Although the OF scheme  produced  a substantial  import liberalization  (Figure 3), with
favorable effects on output in the short run, it represented  an asymmetric  liberalization  of
foreign exchange controls, lowering the cost of import "smuggling"  relative  to export
smuggling. It may well have contributed,  along with expectations  of a further maxi-
devaluation, to the increase in the parallel premium that occurred  between 1984  and the
Figure  3:  Current  A ccount  and  Financing.  1971-1990
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Source: World Bank data.6
From the perspective of the parallel foreign  exchange  market, the key elements of the
1986 structural adjustment  program were the maxi-devaluation  and adoption  of a crawling  peg,
large inflows of external assistance  (Figure 3), and a commitment  to public sector reform with
the objective, among other things, of reducing  the government's  overall borrowing
requirement. The OF scheme was broadened,  and the process of price decontrol gradually
proceeded until by mid-1988  only 12 commodities  remained  under control. The premium fell
dramatically  with the maxi-devaluation  of early 1986, and continued  to fall with the
subsequent smaller adjustments  in the official  exchange  rate. Full unification  of the exchange
rate for current account  purposes was achieved  in the early 1990s, in a sequence  of steps that
began with the licensing of private foreign  exchange  dealers in 1992  and the introduction  of a
weekly Central Bank auction to registered dealers and commercial  banks in 1993, and
culminated  with the removal of remaining  payments  restrictions  on the current account  (e.g.,
export remittance  requirements) in late 1993. In 1994, the move to a market-determined
exchange rate was completed with the elimination  of the Central Bank auction and its
replacement  with a daily inter-bank  foreign  exchange  market as the mechanism  for determining
the official exchange rate (Bank of Tanzania  (1994)).
In summary, the Tanzanian experience  indicates  the difficulties  that can emerge if the
burden of external adjustment  is placed on exchange  controls  and concessional  financing  rather
than on the exchange rate itself or on policies affecting  aggregate  demand. Such a policy is
economically  sustainable  as long as the shocks  in question  are sufficiently  small and short-
lived that they can be absorbed (as in the early 1970s)  by a combination  of temporary aid
inflows, a tightening  of import controls, and a modest rise in the premium. Exchange  controls
are significantly  less successful  when used to maintain  an overvalued  official  exchange  rate in
the face of systematic  internal demand pressures. In this case, growing resource misallocations
and macroeconomic  difficulties  associated  with the exchange  control regime eventually  lead to
a reversal of the government's stance  with respect to the official  exchange  rate; in Tanzania,
policy since 1986  has been geared towards achieving  a more competitive  real exchange  rate
and restoring convertibility  at the official  exchange  rate for current account  purposes. Lasting
reductions in the parallel premium required a restoration  of consistency  between aggregate
demand and the exchange  rate, or effectively  between  fiscal policy and exchange  rate policy.
Reductions in the primary deficit, increases in external aid, and increases  in the rate of crawl
of the official exchange rate all contributed  to the Tanzanian  success  in this endeavor.
1.1 How large was the  parallel market?
Since the parallel foreign exchange market is illegal, there are no direct measures  of the stock
of privately held foreign exchange  or the flow of foreign  exchange  through  the parallel market.
Here we report two sets of evidence on the size of market flows in the 1980s. The best single
estimate is the volume of imports brought in through  the own-funds  scheme. The proportion  of
import licenses allocated to the OF window rose from 19 percent in 1984 to an average  of 36
percent between 1985 and 1988. The share of actual imports financed  by own funds is almost
certainly greater; unofficial estimates  suggest  a share exceeding  one half. 7 This would imply7
that as of the late 1980s, some $500 million  of imports  were being fmanced  through the
parallel foreign exchange  market.
For the economy as a whole, there are two sources of foreign  exchange  for OF
imports. The first is decumulation  of private net foreign assets. Individuals  with assets abroad
can repatriate their dollars, either by selling  them on the parallel foreign exchange  market
(where they can be recycled to individuals  using the OF window),  or by purchasing  own-
funded imports directly. Individuals  without  access to foreign  balances  can bring in own-
funded imports by borrowing foreign  exchange  from relatives  or associates  abroad or by
purchasing the required foreign exchange  on the parallel market. 8 In all of these cases, the net
result is a decumulation  of net foreign exchange  holdings  by the private sector, i.e., the
reverse of capital flight.
The second source of foreign exchange  for own-funded  imports  is the flow supply of
foreign exchange  generated by illegal  exports (e.g., gold smuggling  or illegal sale of housing
services to expatriates)  and overinvoicing  of officially  finaced  imports. What proportion  of
OF imports were financed by illegal  trade? Since  the own-funds  program undoubtedly  led to a
net repatriation of flight capital, the magnitude  of OF imports  provides an upper bound on the
value of gross foreign  exchange inflows from illegal  trade. However,  adjustments  in private
foreign exchange stocks would  be expected  to play themselves  out fairly rapidly, even taking
into consideration  the possibility of a gradual response  as market participants  assess the
credibility  of the "no questions  asked" provision. 9 Therefore, although  it is likely that reverse
capital flight was an important  source of own-funded  imports  early in the program, we would
expect the stock adjustment in response  to the OF opportunity  to have been largely completed
by 1987 or 1988. The magnitude  of OF imports  in the late 1980s should  therefore be a good
indication of the flow supply of foreign exchange  into the parallel market from various illegal
trade channels.
Table 1 draws upon three detailed studies (Bagachwa,  Luvanga  and Mjema (1989),
Maliyamkono  and Bagachwa  (1990), and Mshomba  (1994)) to give some indication  of the
primary categories of illegal  exports and the associated  magnitudes  in the latter half of the
1980s. The largest suspected  sources of illegal foreign  exchange  earnings  were gold exports,
unrecorded tourist expenditures,  expatriate  housing services, illegal  ivory and rhino horns, and
coffee. The total estimated  foreign exchange  inflow  from these activities  is on the order of
$275 million in 1988;  this accounts  for somewhat  more than half of the illegal  trade suggested
by the own-funds  approach. The discrepancy  is presumably  accounted  for by some
combination  of other illegal exports, reverse capital  flight, and overinvoiced  imports.8
Table 1:
Disaggregated  Esdmates  of Unrecorded  Exports
Annual Amount  Period
Export  Source  ($ Millions)  of Estimate
Minerals  M&B  10  1985-88
(mainly gold)
Gold  BLM  14  1988
Diamonds  BLM  1  1988
Tourist expenditure  M&B  36  1980-85
BLM  69  1988
Private expatriate  M&B  43  1988
housing
BLM  34  1988
Illegal tusks and  BLM  148  1988
rhino horns
Coffee arabica  M  8  1969-85
26  1984-85
Sources:  M&B: Maliyamnkono  and Bagachwa  (1990); BLM: Bagachwa, Luvanja  and Mjema (1989); M: Mshomba
(1993).
2. Macroeconomic  determinants of the parallel premium 10
The preceding discussion suggests  that one should  be able to account  for movements  in the
parallel premium using a combination  of trade and portfolio factors. In this section, we
estimate a simple version of the Dombusch, et al (1983) stock-flow  model, which incorporates
both portfolio and trade determinants  of the parallel premium  (see Paper 1). The portfolio
determinants  are the stock of domestic  monetary assets measured  in dollars at the official
exchange  rate (M2/E) and the relative yield on unofficial  foreign exchange  and domestic
monetary assets (or "interest  parity differential,"  IPD). A rise in the domestic  money  stock
measured in foreign exchange  implies an excess relative supply of domestic  assets
(denominated  in Tanzanian shillings)  and a rise in the parallel premium; a rise in the relative9
yield on unofficial  foreign exchange  implies an excess demand  for foreign exchange  and also
raises the premium.
As an overall proxy for the trade determinants,  we use the official real effective
exchange  rate (REER):  a real appreciation  reduces overall exports and therefore unofficial
exports as well, given the value of the premium; at the same time, it increases  the smuggling
of imports  by leading to a tightening  of foreign exchange  rationing controls and an increase in
domestic  price premia on imports. The net effect  of a real official  appreciation  is therefore to
worsen the unofficial  trade balance  for any given level of the parallel premium; equivalently,
for any given value of the unofficial  trade surplus, a real appreciation  raises the value of the
parallel premium. 1I
Since the unofficial  trade balance  does not depend  on the portfolio factors, the
requirement  that it approach  zero in the long run implies that the parallel premium is
determined  only by trade factors in the long run, and not by portfolio factors. To allow for
differences  in the short and long run effects of the various determinants,  we estimate the
following  autoregressive  distributed  lag equation  for the parallel premium:
(1)  Inz,  =  aO +  a,[(M2/E),  - (M2/E)t.,] +  a2(IPDt -IPDt-,)  +  a3(REER, - REERt.,)
+  a4(M/E)t  ,  +  a5IPDt-,  +  a6REER, l  +  a7lnz1,-
The coefficients  a,,  a2 and a3 capture the short-run effects of the three determinants  of the
parallel premium; they give the immediate  impact  of a one-unit increase in each of the
determinants.  The coefficients  a4, a5 and a6 (divided  by 1 - a7) give the long-run effects.  The
hypothesis that portfolio factors matter only in the short run is given by a4 =  a5 =  0. 12
Table 2 gives the results of estimating  equation  (1) using annual data from 1967 to
1988. The results are very satisfactory,  particularly  given the short sample and the uncertain
quality of the data.'3 They give strong support to the conclusion  that both trade and portfolio
factors are at work in determining  the premium  on unofficial  foreign exchange in Tanzania.
All variables  enter with the expected signs: a rise in the interest parity deviation or an increase
in the real value of domestic  financial  assets leads to portfolio substitution  towards unofficial
foreign exchange, raising the premium; a real appreciation  (which is an increase in REER)
shifts incentives  away from export smuggling  and towards import smuggling, raising the
premium. Moreover, we cannot  reject the null hypotheses  that a, and a2 are zero, using
standard F-tests. The results therefore support the prediction  of the model that portfolio factors
influence  the parallel premium in the short run only, and that the premium is determined by
flow factors in the long run.
The parameter estimates  in Table  2 also support the conclusion  that nominal
devaluations  are capable of lowering the parallel premium to the degree that they lower the
foreign exchange  value of domestic  financial  assets or depreciate  the real exchange  rate.  In
both cases, the need for complementary  macroeconomic  policies is clear, to ensure that a10
nominal  devaluation  is not offset  by increases  money supply or domestic prices. While the
underlying mechanisms  driving the domestic  money supply and the domestic price level are
left implicit, a more sophisticated  analysis  would give a central role to the public sector deficit
(including  parastatal  borrowing from the banking sector) in monetary growth and inflation.
This would in turn  imply that control of the public sector deficit is a fundamental  requirement
for achieving  a lasting reduction  in the parallel premium.
Table 2:
Determnants of the Parallel Premium
Dependent Variable: Parallel Premium (PPREM
OLS  ----  IV'  ---
1967-1988  1968-1988
1  2  3  4
CONSTANT  -191.38  -259.94  -195.95  -285.31
(-2.27)  (-2.69)  (-1.39)  (-2.47)
PPREM,,  0.38  0.45  0.71  0.40
(1.49)  (2.03)  (1.41)  (1.60)
d(WM2/E),  0.19  0.24  0.22  0.27
(2.58)  (2.82)  (1.55)  (2.32)
d(IPD),  2.45  1.20  1.91  0.89
(2.16)  (1.09)  (0.76)  (0.58)
d(REER),  3.32  0.80  6.13  0.48
(2.24)  (0.69)  (2.03)  (0.37)
(M2/E),,  -0.05  -0.12  -
(-1.40)  (-1.60)
lPD,.,  3.63  - 4.97  --
(3.03)  (2.74)
REER,,  2.46  3.08  2.56  3.17
(2.78)  (3.09)  (1.84)  (4.26)
RBAR.
2 0.86  0.79  0.80  0.78
Q(  1)(2)  14.73  16.76  8.67  14.78
(0.20)a  (0.12)r  (0e  a53  (0.14)3
(t-statistics are in parentheses.)11
Source: Kaufmann and O'Connell (1991), Table 3.1.
Notes:
'  Instruments for d(REER),  and d(IPD)t are M2,. 2, REER,2 and IPD,. 2 (along with the other right-hand side variables,
which are assumed to be predetermined; note that in the case of PPREM,.,, this is only valid if the disturbances are
serially uncorrelated).
2  Q is the Box-Pierce statistic for testing general serial correlation.  For columns 3 and 4, the statistic reported is Q(10).
I  This is the marginal significance level for the Q statistic.
Data definitions:
PPMR  EM  = 100*(U-E)IE  is the end-of-year  parallel premium in percentage points, with the unofficial and official
exchange rates U and E taken from Kaufmann  and O'Connell (1991), Table 2.1.
M2E$ is end-of-year M2 in TShs (source: IMF, IE,  deflated by the official exchange rate.
IPD = 100*[(1  +1)(E,+,/E)-(1 +1)]  is the uncovered interest parity differential, with r given by the London Eurodollar
deposit rate (source: IEO and I by the Saving deposit rate in Tanzania (source: Bank of Tanzania).
REER is the ratio of the Tanzanian CPI to a trade-weighted  average of WPIs of 8 major developed country partners
(source: World Bank).
TAXCINVis the ratio of the producer price for coffee to the f.o.b. export price in TShs (sources: 1966-79, Bank of
Tanzania, Twenty Years of Independence, Table 24; 1980-88, our calculation using data from the Tanzania
Marketing Development Board, Annual Review of Coffee, 1988).
TOT is the terms of trade (sources: UNCTAD and World Bank).
AID is net official resource transfers in millions of US$ (sources: 1966-84, Collier (1988); 1985-88, World Bank).
2.1  Extending the basic model
While equation (1) captures a large share of the variation in the parallel premium, the
extremely simple form of the equation  obscures some of the underlying  forces at work in
determining  the parallel premium. In this section  we report the results of estimating  an
extended form of the model that captures the trade determinants  more carefully as well as key
features of the exchange control regime. Along with the portfolio factors, we explore the role
of the following  determinants: (a)  the (inverse of the) direct tax on coffee  exports, measured by
the ratio of the domestic producer price of coffee to the f.o.b. export price converted to
Tanzanian shillings (TAXCINV) 4, (ii) the terms of trade (TOT), (iii) net official  resource
transfers in dollars (AID), (iv) the own-funds  scheme (OWNFUADS),  and finally (v) D83, a
dummy variable capturing the 1983 crackdown on 'economic saboteurs' during which a large
number of businessmen  were jailed (Maliyamkono  and Bagachwa  (1990)).
As outlined in Kaufmann  and O'Connell (1991), the extended model is derived in four
steps. First, the unofficial  trade balance  equation is specified more carefully. This allows for
the introduction  of a range of "trade" determinants  of the parallel premium, including  the tax
on coffee exports, the domestic price premium on imports, the intensity  of the enforcement
effort, and the real exchange rate for exports, Second, the domestic price premium on imports
and the real exchange rate for exports are modeled  directly as functions  of the overall
expenditure  and the official allocation of foreign exchange. Third, official  foreign exchange
allocations are modeled as a function of official foreign exchange availability,  thus capturing
the endogenous  trade liberalizations  and import compressions  that accompanied  balance  of
payments fluctuations  in the 1970s and 1980s. Finally, overall expenditure  is modeled  as a12
function of the terms of trade and other variables determining  income and desired aggregate
saving. The resulting reduced form replaces the real exchange  rate in (1) with an unrestricted
linear function of TAXCINV, TOT, AID, OWNFUNDS,  and D83.
The theoretically  predicted signs on these variables are generally  not unambiguous.
Given the parallel premium, a rise in TAXCINV  has two opposing  effects on the premium: the
real exchange rate for coffee exports improves, increasing  aggregate  coffee supply and thus
increasing  coffee smuggling;  but the share of exports diverted onto unofficial  channels  also
rises, reducing the premium. The net effect on illegal exports, and thus on the premium, is an
empirical question.
TOT enters in a number of ways: (I) through the endogenous  trade liberalization  that
follows an improvement  in the balance of payments; (2) through a direct valuation  effect on
the illegal trade deficit; (3) through resource movements  in favor of exports and away from
imports; and (4) through effects on aggregate  demand, depending  on the savings  response.
The first three of these would be expected to lower the parallel premium;  the third would raise
it, to an extent depending  on the savings response. Overall, we expect a net negative effect.
A rise in AID should lower the premium both through direct increases in illegal  export
flows (e.g., aid flows may serve as a proxy for the demand for expatriate  housing services)
and through the endogenous  trade liberalization  effect; it should  raise the premium to the
degree that it raises aggregate demand. Again, we expect a negative  effect on balance,
although the aggregate demand effect might be rather strong given that changes in aid have a
strong permanent component.
OWNFUNDS  is a dummy  variable for the years 1984 and 1985, during which the own-
funds scheme was in operation (due to data availability  limitations,  the sample only extends  to
1985). As argued in O'Connell (1992), an own-funds  scheme reduces  the cost of what was  ,
previously import smuggling, leading to a rise in the volume  of imports financed  at the parallel
rate; unless the import liberalization  gives rise to a strong aggregate  export supply  response,
the parallel premium must rise to bring forth the required increase  in export smuggling. We
therefore expect OWNFUNDS  to have a positive effect on the premium, given the values of the
other variables.
D83 has a theoretically ambiguous  effect. From the illegal trade side, a crackdown
simultaneously  affects the supply and the demand for illegal foreign exchange, with uncertain
net result. Effects operating through the portfolio side are clearer, since a crackdown  impairs
the liquidity of foreign exchange  assets and reduces their expected  yield; these effects  tend to
reduce the premium.
The results are in Table 3. Most of the variables have the expected signs. Both
portfolio and flow determinants  enter significantly, with magnitudes  generally  close to those
found in Table 2. Of the flow determinants,  however, only the TOT comes in strongly, with
the lagged TOT exerting a strong negative effect on the premium (as observed, for example,13
during and after the coffee  boom). Lagged  aid inflows  also lower the premium, although  the
effect is not estimated  precisely. The effect of lagged  terms of trade and lagged aid is
consistent with a substantial  endogenous  trade liberalization  in response  to balance  of payments
improvements;  this corroborates evidence  from import equations  in Ndulu and Lipumba  (n.d.).
Table 3:
Deterninants  of the Premium:  Extended  Model
Dependent variable: Parallel Premium (PPREA-I)
1967-1988
------ OLS --------  --------  IVI--
CONSTANT  369.06  285.57  381.13  226.83
(1.33)  (1.19)  (1.33)  (0.73)
PPREM,  0.51  0.66  0.60  1.12
(2.08)  (3.01)  (1.78)  (2.66)
d  (M2/E),  0.19  0.29  0.16  0.55
(1.85)  (2.98)  (1.50)  (2.54)
d  (IPD),  3.33  2.28  3.46  0.58
(2.83)  (2.08)  (2.22)  (0.28)
TAXCINV,j  -1.00  -1.01  -1.02  -0.40
(-0.48)  (-0.57)  (-0.47)  (-0.17)
TOT-,  -2.42  -1:68  -2.60  -1.72
(-1.30)  (-1.03)  (-1.35)  (-0.83)
AID,.,  -0.12  -0.24  -0.14  -0.42
(-0.82)  (-1.83)  (-0.89)  (-2.01)
OWNFUANDS  157.46  203.93  160.81  232.26
(2.59)  (3.68)  (2.58)  (3.18)
D83  --  222.07  --  315.10
(2.41)  (2.32)
RBAR  2  0.73  0.81  0.72  0.68
D-W  1.39  1.78  L.54  2.79
Q(10)(2)  5.49  12.05  5.92  16.86
(0.86)3  (0.28ar  (0.82)3  (0.08)3
(t-statistics are in parentheses)14
Notes:
I Instruments for d(IPD),  are (M2IE),  2, TAXC,. 2, TOT,  2, and D83, along witi the other right-hand side variables.
2  Q is the Box-Pierce statistic for testing general serial correlation. For colinms 7 and 8, the statistic reported is Q(9).
3  This is the marginal significance level for the Q statistic.
Data defintions: see Table 2.
The coefficient  on the coffee tax variable is consistently  negative  but insignificant,
implying  that any smuggling  response  is more than offset  by an aggregate  coffee  supply
response  in the opposite direction.  While this finding  does not rule out a macroeconomic  role
for coffee smuggling  in determining  the parallel premium, it suggests  that the elasticity  of
smuggling  supply is low in the coffee sector, at least over the horizon of a year.
The own-funds  scheme appears  to have raised the premium, ceteris  paribus, as
predicted by the model in the absence of a strong aggregate  export supply  response. The
magnitude  of the increase, between 150  and 240 percentage  points, is impressive,  and suggests
that the low elasticity  of export smuggling  indicated  in the coffee  case may be a more general
phenomenon  in Tanzania. More obviously,  the results suggest  that the lowering of the parallel
premium since 1986 has been a function of other developments  in policy and external
conditions, such as (1)  cumulative  depreciations  of the official  exchange  rate that reduced the
real stock of domestic  money, and (ii) large inflows of foreign aid; and not of the own-funds
scheme itself.
The 1983 crackdown  also appears  to have raised the premium, holding other variables
constant; this suggests that the crackdown  had a particularly  strong effect on export
smuggling.
These results must be viewed  as provisional,  given the short sample and the limited set
of variables that we were able to incorporate.  Nonetheless,  they do shed some light on the
particular forces at work in determining  the parallel premium in Tanzania.
3.  Fiscal effects of unification
One of the goals of Tanzanian  policy since the mid-1980s  has been to restore the central role
of commercial  policy considerations  in the granting of import licenses,  a role usurped by
constraints on overall foreign  exchange  availability  since at least the late 1970s. For the
remainder of the paper, we consider the fiscal implications  of "unifying"  the official  and
parallel exchange markets for current account  purposes,  by which we mean achieving  and
sustaining  full convertibility  of the shilling for imports  (subject  to commodity-specific  tariffs
and/or quotas). We model  a movement  towards unification  as a sustained  fall in the parallel
premium that is achieved  through simultaneous  liberalization  of import licensing  at the official
exchange rate and exchange  rate adjustments  designed to facilitate  this occurring without
excessive losses in international  reserves. The theoretical  literature on dual exchange  rate15
systems suggests  that required adjustments  in the exchange  rate may be accomplished  either
through an 'overnight' float of the exchange  rate or through  an appropriate  combination  of
changes  in the level and possibly rate of crawl of the official  rate." 5 Capital  controls are
assumed  to remain in place; this implies that the parallel market will not disappear altogether,
since any situation  of portfolio  disequilibrium  will give rise to a premium (which  may be
negative)  and illegal trade flows. But in the absence  of convertibility  restrictions  on the trade
account, the premium  will be zero in a steady state.
The effects  on government  revenue of central  bank transactions  at multiple official
exchange rates are well known (e.g., Sherwood  (1956), Easterly, et al (1994)). Recent work
on parallel markets has emphasized  that exchange  controls have important  "shadow" fiscal
implications  even when all transactions  of the central bank take place at a single exchange rate.
In particular, Pinto (1989,1991)  has argued  that if the government  is a net seller of foreign
exchange to the private sector, exchange  rate unification  imposes  a fiscal shock that will raise
money growth and inflation in the long run unless the policy package  includes contractionary
fiscal measures.
As indicated  in Figure 4, Tanzania  appears  to have avoided any tradeoff between
inflation  and the parallel premium  during its move towards unification,  enjoying  a
simultaneous  reduction in both variables  in the second  half of the 1980s. Part of this may be
associated  with an improvement  in inflationary  expectations  associated  with the reduction in
fiscal deficits in the first half of the decade (from  20 percent in 1979 to 7.5 percent in 1985),
and the improvements  in overall fiscal management  obtained  under the reform program.
Moreover, the direct cost-push  effect of nominal  devaluations  undertaken in the mid-1980s
was minimized  by the fact that domestic  prices were determined  at the margin largely by the
parallel exchange  rate rather than the official  exchange  rate. But the fiscal fundamentals  made
little direct contribution  in the second half of the decade, as central government  deficits
fluctuated  between 6 and 10 percent of GDP and off-budget  losses of the public sector grew
over the period (Mans (1994)). The relatively  favorable  outcome  for inflation  during the
unification  process therefore raises the possibility  that the longer-run fiscal effect of the
parallel premium  was negative  over the period in question, so that reductions  in the premium--
holding the fiscal deficit constant--had  the direct effect of reducing  the underlying rate of
monetary growth and inflation. 16 In this section, we explore this possibility  by providing rough
counterfactual  estimates  of the fiscal effect  of exchange  rate unification  from 1976  to the
present. We begin by generalizing  Pinto's theoretical  analysis  of the inflationary  effect of
exchange  rate unification.16
Figure  4:  Inflation  and  the  Parallel  Prem  ium  . 1976.90
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Source: CPI and official  exchange  rate from IMF, International  Financial  Statistics;  parallel exchange  rate from
International  Currency  Analysis  Inc., World  Currency  Yearbook,  and Kaufmann  and O'Connell (1991),
3.1  Some steady-state  accounting" 7
The effect on inflation of a reduction in the parallel premium  ultimately  depends, given the
growth in real money demand, on its effect  on monetary  expansion.  We therefore require an
expression  for the flow supply of domestic  monetary assets.
The consolidated  public sector in Tanzania  incorporates  central and local governments,
parastatals, and a banking system that until recently  consisted  of the Bank of Tanzania and a
single nationalized  commercial  bank. Since  the banking system did very little lending to the
private sector and there was virtually no domestic  government  bond market in the period under
study, the flow supply of broad money  is approximately  equal to the domestic financing of the
consolidated  public sector:" 8
(2)  M  =  D  _  E(a'-
Domestic  =  Public  - Foreign
financing  sector  financing
deficit
where M and D are the broad money  supply and the consolidated  public sector deficit, and r
and a are international  reserves and foreign inflows in the form of aid and loans. The
superscript "  *" denotes a quantity  denominated  in foreign currency, and a dot over a variable
denotes  a time derivative.
Using the balance of payments  identity  F  = b"9  + b*, where b'g and b' are the
government  and private-sector  balances  of official  foreign exchange  transactions  with the17
banking system, equation (2) can be written  Mt = D - E(a* - O*) - Eb*. But since all foreign
exchange  transactions  by the public sector are mediated  through the banking system, the
quantity  E(a*  - bO) is simply  the foreign currency  component  of the public sector deficit.
What is left over after subtracting  this from the overall deficit is the domestic currency
component,  Dd, giving us the following  alternative  to (2):
(3)  M  =  Dd  +  Eb*.
In real terms, equations (2) and (3) imply
(4)  I/P = in +  m  = d - e-l(a*  - *)  = dd + e-lb*,
where P is the domestic  price index, m - MIP is real money balances, 1-  P/P is the rate of
inflation, and e - PIE is the (official)  real exchange  rate. The flow supply of domestic  money
balances can therefore be calculated  either as the consolidated  public sector deficit net of
foreign financing  or as the sum of the domestic  currency component  of the deficit and net
purchases of foreign  exchange from the private sector.
Turning to the demand side, the empirical evidence in the previous section is consistent
with a model in which domestic monetary assets and foreign exchange are imperfect
substitutes  in private portfolios and that asset transactions  take place at the parallel exchange
rate. An asset demand formulation  that captures these features can be written m = h(tU!U)w,
where w - (M +  U  f 9)IP  is real wealth and UJ/U  is the expected rate of depreciation of the
parallel exchange rate (which is equal to the actual under perfect foresight). A rise in expected
depreciation  increases  the opportunity  cost of holding wealth in the form of domestic monetary
assets, so that h'  <  O.19  Since all nominal  variables must grow at the same rate in a steady
state, we have tU/U  =  7c, and the following  relationship  holds between long-run values of the
variables:
(5)  ith(7r)w  =  d - e-la* = d  + e-'b*.
Equation (5) helps tie down the inflation  rate in the long run by requiring that the
domestic financing  requirement  be fully covered by the inflation tax. More importantly for our
purposes, to the degree that variables in (5) are jointly determined  with the parallel premium,
it provides a long-run relationship  between inflation and the premium that can help determine
the inflationary  effects of exchange rate unification.  These effects are complex in principle,
since all of the variables in (5) are jointly determined  with the parallel premium in general
equilibrium. In the following limiting case, analyzed  by Pinto (1989), the effect of unification
on inflation comes down to a question of whether the private sector is a net buyer or seller of
foreign exchange to the government:18
Proposition 1 (Pinto (1989)) Suppose (1) that the domestic  financing requirement  d - a' is
positive; (2) that the private sector consumes  only imports, and that these are priced at the
parallel exchange rate (P = U); (3) that the elasticity of the  function h is between zero and -1;
(4) that real wealth (w) and private sector net sales of  foreign exchange  to the banking  system
(b*)  are constant with respect to the parallel premium across steady states; and (5) that the
real domestic currency component  of the public sector deficit (dd)  is also constant with respect
to the parallel premium across steady states.  Then: exchange  rate unification will cause a rise
(fall)  in inflation if and only if the  private sector is a net seller (buyer)  offoreign exchange  vis-
a-vis the government.
To prove Proposition 1, let z - UIE be (one plus) the parallel premium, and define
0  E  e-lb*I(dl + e-'b)  = e-lb*l(d - a*)
as the ratio of the private sector official balance of payments to the overall financing
requirement. Log-differentiate  (5) under the stated assumptions  to get dln7r/dlnz  = Oe/(l  +
h,), where we use subscripts to denote elasticities  (e.g., h,, is the elasticity of the function h
with respect to yr).  Since P  =  U by assumption, we have e  = l/z  and e,  =  -1.  This implies
(6)  dlnTl/dlnz E  =  -O/(1  + h 2 .
Since 0 > ( < ) 0 if and only if b* > ( <) 0, the reduction in z that accompanies  unification will
raise inflation if and only if b'  > 0 and reduce it if and only if b* < 0.
Although the Pinto analysis would appear to rely on an impossibly  restrictive set of
assumptions,  it is worth being precise about where these assumptions  are weakest in describing
the Tanzanian case. Assumptions 1 - 3 are in fact plausible approximations  of reality for
Tanzania and for many other countries  with parallel markets. Assumption 1 is confirmed for
Tanzania by column 3 of Table 4, where the growth of broad money  typically exceeds 5
percent of GDP. Assumption  2 is simply  an extreme version of our earlier argument that
domestic prices are closely linked to the parallel exchange rate in an exchange-control  regime
with severe import rationing; what is actually required here is the weaker (and highly
plausible) assumption  that a sustainable  exchange-rate-led  unification must be accompanied  by
a real depreciation (so that e, < 0). Assumption  3 is more questionable;  it is equivalent to the
requirement  that the inflation  rate be below the rate that maximizes  inflation tax revenues.
Measured inflation has never exceeded  40% in Tanzania, and we will proceed under the
assumption  that the rates experienced  are below the revenue-maximizing  rate. 20
Assumption  4 abstracts from general equilibrium  effects. We loosen this assumption  in
Section 3.1.1 below to allow changes in the parallel premium  to be reflected in trade flows and
private sector wealth. For the remainder of this section, however, we focus on Assumption  5,
which restricts the base for the tax/subsidy scheme represented  by the parallel premium to
private sector net sales of foreign exchahge  to the banking  system. The underlying assumption19
is that net domestic currency flows in the public sector are fixed in real terms. This is a
troublesome assumption in the Tanzanian  case, since a number of important  flows, including
customs duties and parastatal purchases of the export crop, are more closely linked to the
official exchange rate than to the overall price level. The following  proposition generalizes  the
earlier result in a way that will be useful for our subsequent  calculations,  by identifying
domestic currency flows that are indexed  to the official  exchange  rate:
Proposition  2  Suppose that assumptions  1 - 4 of Proposition  1 hold, and that assumption  5 is
replaced by the assumption  that an amount  x' (measured  in dollars at the official rate) of the
overall deficit consists of domestic currencyflows indexed  to the official exchange  rate. All
remaining  domestic currency  flows (dd  -x*)  continue  to be fixed in real terms. Define
H' - e)'(x* + b*)/(dd  + e'lb*)  = e1'(x* + b*)I(d  - a*)
as the ratio of such indexed  flows to the overall domestic  borrowing  requirement.  Then:
exchange rate unification will cause a rise (fall)  in inflation  if and only if 0'  > (<) 0.
To prove this proposition, simply log-differentiate  (5) as before to obtain;  =  -07'(1  + h,).
In the Pinto analysis, unification  tends to be inflationary  when governments  rely on net
purchases of foreign exchange  from the private sector to finance official imports (including
debt service). According to Proposition  2, this tendency  can be overturned if domestic
currency flows that are closely linked  to the official  exchange  rate are in sufficient surplus.
3.1.1 General equilibrium complications
The results of the previous section indicate  that indexation  of the domestic currency
budget can be extremely important in determining  the inflationary  impact of exchange-rate-led
unification. In this section we ask about the appropriateness  of assumption  (4), which abstracts
from general equilibrium complications.  The discussion  suggests  that the likelihood  of a
favorable impact of reductions of the premium  on inflation  is even stronger than indicated  in
the previous section.
The first general equilibrium  complication  arises from the linkage between export
supply and real wealth that emerges from the requirement  of a balanced  overall current
account in the long run. If aggregate  export supply is negatively  correlated with the parallel
premium across steady states, as suggested  by the Tanzanian  experience  reviewed  in Section 1,
a move towards unification will raise export supply  and thereby increase  the level of real
wealth consistent with current account  balance. This in turn increases  the base for the inflation
tax (see equation (5)), allowing a reduction in the required inflation  tax rate.
The second complication  works through the effects of the premium on official  trade
volumes. Pinto's analysis and our calculations  both assumed  that the private sector's net sales
of foreign exchange to the banking system were uncorrelated  with the premium across steady
states. In reality, a reduction in the steady state premium will be associated  with an increase  in20
official trade volumes, as aggregate  exports respond to real depreciation  and exports that
would previously have been smuggled  are channeled  through the official  market. The effect on
the private sector's net sales of foreign  exchange  is likely  to be negligible, since changes in
export revenues are passed on directly to increased  import allocations  in an exchange  control
regime of the Tanzanian style; but the increase  in import volumes brings a customs  revenue
boom. This revenue boom reduces the domestic  currency  component  of the consolidated  public
sector deficit, reducing monetary  emission  and inflation  in the steady state.
3.2  Calculating the fiscal  effect
In this section we apply the logic of Proposition  2 to Tanzanian  data by (I) using
balance of payments data to approximate  private sector net sales of foreign exchange  to the
banking system, and (ii) splitting  domestic  currency  expenditure  and revenue flows of the
consolidated  public sector into flows that are (to a first approximation)  indexed  fully to the
official exchange rate and flows that are (to a first approximation)  indexed to the domestic
price level. We ask a simple question:  viewing  the parallel premium as an implicit  tax on
individuals  who surrender foreign exchange  receipts at the official exchange  rate (or receive
payments indexed to the official  rate) and an implicit  subsidy  to individuals  who receive
foreign exchange at the official rate (or make payments  indexed  to the official  rate), what are
the direct effects on monetary emission  of this "shadow" tax/subsidy  scheme?  We will see that
there is a close relationship  between this calculation,  which is a generalization  of familiar
calculations  of the revenue impact of multiple  exchange  rates, and the inflationary  impacts  of
unification studied in the previous section.
Define the direct monetary effect (DME)  of the premium as the reduction in monetary
emission consequent  on pricing foreign currency  flows (and indexed  domestic  currency flows)
at the official rather than the parallel rate, holding  underlying real quantities  (measured  in
dollars) fixed. From (3), this can be written





The change in money growth has two components.  Given our indexation  assumptions,
(U-E)x*  is simply the change in the domestic  currency component  of the deficit that would
occur if the official exchange rate were devalued  by the amount U - E and this was translated
fully into a real devaluation  (in this case, the domestic  price level is unchanged;  since we are
assuming that the remainder of the domestic  currency  budget is fixed in real terms, there are
no further effects on monetary expansion  from domestic  currency flows). The second term,
(U-E)b*, has a direct analogy in the fiscal gain enjoyed by the public sector in a multiple21
exchange rate system when the central  bank buys and sells foreign exchange  at different  rates
(cf. Sherwood (1956), Dornbusch (1986a,b);  we therefore  call it the 'central bank profits'
effect.
Equation (7) applies to an economy  in which money  growth is quite clearly a 'fiscal'
phenomenon;  indeed, the monetary effect can also be written as DME  = DFE - (U -
E)(a*-;*), where DFE  = (U - E)(x  + a* - b*g)  is the (analogously defined) direct fiscal
effect of the premium. The monetary  effect is therefore  simply  the fiscal effect corrected  for
the implicit  revaluation  of net foreign financing  implied  by the premium. For a given value of
DFE, a larger level of foreign financing  reduces  the monetary  benefits of the premium, since it
implies a reduction in the private sector's net sales of foreign exchange  to the banking system.
In effect, the government  is implicitly  passing on a larger net subsidy  to the ultimate recipient-
-the private sector--of  these foreign  inflows.
Not surprisingly, the DME has a close relationship  with the parameter 0' governing  the
inflationary  impact  of exchange-rate-led  changes in the parallel premium across steady states.
Denoting the parallel premium  by 4  )  z - 1 =  (U - E)IE, and noting that 0'  = E(x* +
b*)IAM,  we have
(8)  DMEIAM = 4f0'
where AM is the monetary  emission that would occur under the counterfactual  of no change in
the parallel premium. 2"
Implementation  of (7) is made difficult  by the fact that the fiscal and balance  of
payments  accounts do not identify  flows associated  with the large Tanzanian  parastatal  sector.
Data on the foreign exchange  cash flow of the banking system, which would allow direct
measurement  of at least b,  are also unavailable.  We therefore approach (7) by making a set of
adjustments  to the standard fiscal and balance  of payments  accounts  in order to separate  the
parastatal sector from the private sector. We also require a set of assumptions  regarding
indexation  of the underlying flows; the assumptions  regarding  indexation  are in Appendix
Table 2. A thorough description  of the calculations,  which we summarize  here, is also in the
Appendix.
3.2.1 The central bank  profits effect
Calculating  private sector net sales of foreign  exchange  to the banking system requires two
adjustments  to the balance of payments  data on trade flows. The first is to remove the
influence  of the public sector, including  parastatals. On the export side, we subtract from total
exports traditional exports (coffee, cotton, and other traditional  crops), which are marketed
through parastatals; we also subtract the 15 percent of non-traditional  exports that we assume
are produced by parastatals. The remainder  is private sector exports, x P. On the import side,22
we use 1990 data to identify  the share of the total import  bill going to the consolidated  public
sector in that year; we then extrapolate  backwards,  making  changes in the share to reflect our
best assessment  of the net impact  of factors  affecting  the public share.  We then multiply  the
implied  private sector share by total imports  to get official  private imports, qP.
The second adjustment  to the balance  of payments  data is to eliminate  own-funded
imports, qow,  starting in 1984; these enter the official  statistics  but are not mediated  through
the banking system. Finally, private sector capital flows, which are illegal, are assumed  t take
place only in the parallel market  The central bank profits effect is therefore given by (U-E)b?
=  (U-E)(x,P  - qP +  q.,).
3.2.2 The domestic  budget balance  effect
Our task here is made simpler  by the fact that we only have to identify  public sector flows that
are denominated  in domestic  currency  but to a first approximation  indexed  to the official
exchange  rate. Among  these we include marketing  board purchases of traditional  exports, in
dollar amount  x';  using m. - 1 - (Px m/E)  to denote the margin imposed  by parastatal  export
marketing boards between the world price and the domestic  producer price of the crops
purchased  from peasants, and assuming  this margin  to be fixed with respect to the official
exchange rate, the amount  actually  paid to peasants (measured  in dollars at the official rate) is
(l-m,,)x". 22 Also included are marketing  board sales of imports, qf, and taxes--primarily
customs duties--directly  indexed  to the official  exchange  rate, T.23  All other domestic  currency
flows of the public sector are assumed  to be indexed  fully to the domestic  price level. Under
these assumptions,  the domestic  budget  balance  effect can be written (U-E)[(1-mx)x'  - q-  -
.rI.
3.3 Baseline Results
Equation (7) can now be written
(9)  DME  =  (U-E)[(1-m,)x-  - q-  - -r  +  (U-E)(x 0P - qP +  q.n).
Domestic  budget  Central bank
balance  effect  profits effect
Column 4 of Table 4 shows  the estimated  DME  relative  to current GDP for 1976-1993.
The calculations  through 1989 are based on actual fiscal and balance of payments  data; for
1990-1993  we use our own projections  of the underlying  flows. Table 5 and Figure 5
decompose  this overall effect into its two major components,  the domestic  budget  balance
effect and the central bank profits effect.23
Table 4:
Direct Monetary Effect of the Parallel Premium'7 2
(percent)
---Actual ----------  ----------  Estimates of DME/Y --------------
Baseline -----  -- Alternative Scenarios -
-----  (Using U-E) --------
SmalU  Large/
Parallel  Using  Using  Efficient  Inefficient
Year  Premium  AM/M,  AMIY  U-E  .6(U-E) 4 Public Sector  Public Sector
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)
1976  161%  25.1  5.7  7.5  4.5  3.0  14.5
1977  159  20.2  4.9  0.5  0.3  -4.0  7.4
1978.  70  12.6  3.3  -4.1  -2.5  -6.5  -1.0
1979  46  46.9  12.2  -0.2  -0.1  -1.9  2.0
1980  156  26.9  8.9  0.4  0.2  -5.2  7.4
1981  233  18.1  6.5  4.1  2.5  -2.5  12.8
1982  251  19.5  6.9  -1.6  -1.0  -7.4  5.9
1983  255  17.8  6.3  0.6  0.4  -3.9  6.6
1984  266  3.7  1.2  -0.4  -0.2  -5.7  6.7
1985  477  30.3  7.3  -2.2  -1.3  -13.7  5.5
1986  405  27.9  7.1  -12.4  -7.4  -21.9  2.0
1987  180  32.1  7.3  -8.3  -5.0  -15.1  -0.7
1988  111  32.1  7.1  -7.3  -4.4  -10.6  -0.7
1989  77  29.5  6.6  -6.8  -4.1  -8.0  -0.7
19903  78  42.1  12.1  -9.0  -5.7  -7.8  -3.2
19913  71  26.1  8.1  -10.6  -6.2  -14.0  -5.7
19923  19  38.9  12.0  -9.3  -2.0  -4.4  -1.9
19933  2  28.4  9.6  -8.3  -0.2  -0.5  -0.2
Sources:  1976-89:  monetary, fiscal and balance of payments data are from the World Bank. Black market exchange rates
from the World Currency Yearbook,  various years, supplemented  by the survey conducted by Maliyamkono and
Bagachwa (1990); see Kaufmann and O'Connell (1991) for details. Official exchange rates are from the IMF. Parallel
premium is the average of monthly figures.
1990-93:  actual monetary  and GDP data (columns 2 and 3) are from Bank of Tanzania, Economic Bulletin, September
1994.  Balance of payments flows underlying columns  4-7 are based on authors' projections rather than actual data.
Parallel premiums  are based on end-of-year  figures from World Currency  Alert and IMF.
Notes:
' See Table 5 for a decomposition  of the results in column 4 and Appendix Table 2 for a full description of the
assumptions underlying the simulations  in columns 4 - 7.
2 Y is current year GDP.
Based on authors' projections of fiscal and balance of payments data. See note on sources.
4 This assumes that the parallel exchange  rate overestimates  the shadow equilibrium real exchange rate by 40 percent of
the premium.24
Table 5:
Decomposidion  of Baseline Case
(shares of GDP)
Components  of x  ---------  Components of b  ------
t( 1-m.)Xl  -,  -ql"  + xp  - qP  +q.,.,
Export  Trade  Sales  Private  Private  Own-
crop  tax  of  sector  sector  funded
Year  xI  b'  outlays  revenue  imports  exports  imports  imports
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8))
1976  2.0%  2.7  8.3  -3.8  -2.5  9.7  -7.5  0.5
1977  0.8  -0.5  7.8  -4.5  -2.5  5.6  -6.5  0.4
1978  -2.5  -3.3  4.8  -4.3  -3.0  5.9  -9.5  0.4
1979  -3.1  2.7  4.0  -3.8  -3.3  7.8  -5.4  0.3
1980  -2.0  2.3  3.7  -2.6  -3.2  7.9  -5.9  0.3
1981  0.3  1.4  4.4  -1.6  -2.5  6.7  -5.5  0.3
1982  -0.2  -0.4  3.1  -1.3  -2.0  3.9  -4.5  0.2
1983  0.1  0.2  2.9  -1.3  -1.6  3.4  -3.4  0.2
1984  0.2  -0.3  3.5  -1.6  -1.7  3.5  -4.5  0.7
1985  -1.0  0.5  2.4  -1.9  -1.5  3.7  -5.3  2.2
1986  -1.8  -1.2  4.4  -4.0  -2.2  3.1  -8.6  4.3
1987  -5.4  0.8  3.7  -5.8  -3.3  6.5  -13.3  7.5
1988  -5.6  -0.9  3.1  -5.1  -3.6  7.0  -16.1  8.2
1989  -6.4  -2.4  3.6  -5.8  -4.2  8.7  -22.1  11.0
1990'  -5.9  -6.3  4.9  -6.4  -4.4  12.2  -29.4  10.8
19911  -5.4  -9.1  5.4  -6.5  -4.4  13.9  -32.8  9.9
1992'  -5.2  -11.7  6.5  -7.0  -4.7  18.5  -40.8  9.8
1993'  -4.4  -12.9  7.0  -6.7  -4.8  22.0  -43.7  8.8
Source: Underlying  fiscal and balance  of payments data are from the World Bank and the authors' projections.
Notes: This is a decomposition of column 4 in Table 4. The data in that column are given by DME/Y =
[(U-E)/E](x + b-), where [(U-E)/EIx and  [(U-E)/E]b are the "domestic budget balance effect" and the "central bank
profits effect", respectively.  The quantities in x  and b- are dollar flows converted to TShs using the official exchange rate
and then deflated by nominal GDP.
' Results for 1990-93 are based on authors' projections of fiscal and balance of payments data.25
Figure  5:  Decom  position  of  the  Direct  M  onetary  Effect  of  the  Parallel  Prem  ium





0  0  0~~~~~a,  C  0,
M  onetary  effect  ---  C  entral  bank  profits  effect
D om  estic  budget  balance  effect
Source: Authors' calculations, summarized  in Table 5.
Several conclusions  can be drawn from the data. First, the DME is often large; it
exceeds five percent of GDP in magnitude  for half of the observations  in the sample. The
DME remains substantial  in many years even under the conservative  assumption  that the
parallel rate overstates the appropriate shadow rate by 40 percent of the observed  premium
(column 5). Second, the DME shows a substantial  amount of persistence, so that it is possible
to distinguish at least two, and perhaps three distinct regimes in the sample. The sample begins
in 1976, the first year of the coffee boom, and the monetary effect makes a rapid transition
from 7.5 percent of GDP to  4.1 percent in 1978. This is the joint effect of the collapse of the
coffee boom, which improved the domestic  budget balance  by drastically  reducing outlays  for
purchases of coffee by the marketing  board, and the temporary  import liberalization  of 1978,
which dramatically reduced private sector net sales of foreign exchange  to the banking  system.
After the 1976-78 transition, the DME fluctuates  around zero for the period from
1979 to 1985, notwithstanding  an increase in the parallel premium  to over 230 percent by
1981 and a subsequent  increase to nearly 500 percent in 1985. Both the domestic  budget
balance effect and the central bank profits effect are small for most of this period, a
development  driven by a reduction in export proceeds remitted to the banking system and the
onset of severe rationing of foreign exchange for imports. The private sector's net purchases
of foreign exchange  hover near zero for most of the period, suggesting  that the low and falling
export receipts were being channeled  directly to private sector imports, while official imports
were largely financed  through aid and increases in arrears. As indicated  in the further
decomposition  in Table 5, the contraction in trade reduced the revenue base for customs  duties
and export taxes, roughly offsetting  the net contractionary  effect of other indexed items in the
domestic budget balance.26
A clear break occurs in 1986, a year in which the figures suggest that unification
would have converted monetary growth of 7 percent of GDP into monetary  contraction  of over
5 percent. From 1986 on, the monetary effect is consistently  negative and above 6.5 percent of
GDP. On the domestic budget balance side, this dramatic  change is largely the result of a
customs revenue boom (Table 5). A strong contribution  is also made by increases in the
private sector's net purchases of foreign exchange  from the banking system. Both
developments  were decisively influenced  by the large inflows of external  aid that became
available starting in 1986. A large portion of this aid was channeled  to the private sector, in
line with the Government's liberalization  and structural adjustment  priorities. The customs
revenue boom was further propelled by the expansion  of aggregate  imports  brought about by
the introduction  of the own-funds  window in 1984 and its rapid expansion  starting in 1985.
3.3.1 Two alternative scenarios
Table 4 reports two further calculations  using alternative  assumptions  about the size and
efficiency  of the public sector. The underlying assumptions  are given in Appendix Table 2.
Relative to the baseline, a large/inefficient  public sector is assumed  to take a 15 percent higher
share of imports and to lose to corruption a share of the marketing  margin equal to 15 percent
of the producer price paid to peasant producers of traditional  exports. For the period from
1991 to 1993, the large/inefficient  public sector also collects  lower import  duties and sales
taxes on imports (lowering the term 'r in equation  (7) by 2.6, 6.5, and 9 percent, respectively,
relative to the baseline in 1991, 1992 and 1993), due to laxity in enforcement. A more
efficient public sector takes a 15 percent smaller share of imports and collects  higher trade
taxes (by 5.1, 11, and 13.6 percent relative to the baseline  in 1991, 1992 and 1993).
These differences in size and/or efficiency  of the public sector affect the DME by
changing  the base for both the domestic  budget balance  effect and the central bank profits
effect. Under the large/inefficient  scenario, we attribute a larger share of total imports to the
public sector and thus implicitly  assume a larger private trade surplus; we simultaneously
assume an increase  in the government's deficit in items indexed  to the official  exchange rate,
through a combination of corruption and laxity in enforcement.  For both reasons, the direct
monetary effect of the premium, and thus the temptation  to maintain  an overvalued  official
exchange rate, is greater than under the baseline  case. In the efficient  case, we implicitly
assume a larger private trade deficit and a smaller public sector deficit in items indexed to the
official exchange rate. Both assumptions  weaken the incentive  for containing  monetary growth
through an overvalued exchange rate; exchange  rate unification  would  have tended for most of
the sample to reward the efficient government  with a reduction  in monetary  growth.
These calculations  underscore the fundamentally  fiscal impetus  behind the
maintenance  of overvalued exchange rates and hence the adoption  of exchange  controls. They
also give some sense of the sensitivity of our calculations  to some of the underlying
assumptions;  while the magnitude  of the DME is sensitive  to these assumptions,  there remains
a clear reduction in the estimated  DMEs in the mid 1980s, suggesting  a turning point in favor27
of a positive fiscal effect of exchange  rate unification.  Rodrik (1989)  applies  a simple  test to
policy reforms that are ultimately  guided  by efficiency  considerations  but take place under
conditions of macroeconomic  instability  and potentially  low credibility: "does the proposed
reform directly contribute  to the goals of macroeconomic  stability  and fiscal retrenchment"?
(p. 10).  Our calculations  suggest  a resounding "yes" for exchange-rate  unification  by the mid-
1980s.
4.  Conclusions
Our first aim in this paper was to characterize  the macroeconomic  forces underlying  the
emergence and growth of the parallel market and the premium  in Tanzania.  We have found
that both portfolio and trade flow determinants  played important  roles, and that the premium
responded  to these variables as predicted  by the theory. We trace the rising premium between
1966 and 1986  to a growing inconsistency  between macroeconomic  policies  and the exchange
rate regime; the premium was brought down definitively  starting  in 1986 when the authorities
instituted  a maxi-devaluation,  adopted  a crawling  peg, and entered  upon a major structural
adjustment  effort generously supported  by external  donors.
Our second aim was to investigate  the fiscal impact  of the parallel premium in an
exchange-control  regime. We have shown that while a long-run  tradeoff  between inflation  and
the parallel premium will prevail if inflation  rates are moderate  and the real deficit and foreign
financing flows are exogenous, an exchange-rate-led  unification  brings a variety of
macroeconomic  mechanisms  into play that reduce the likelihood  of a highly inflationary  long-
run outcome  and may even produce a reduction in inflation.  In the Tanzanian  case, our
calculations  of the short-run outcome  under plausible  assumptions  regarding  the indexation  of
public sector revenues and expenditures  suggest  that starting in the mid-1980s,  more
aggressive  depreciation  of the official  exchange  rate would have delivered  a substantial  fiscal
bonus, reducing  monetary growth and therefore moderating  inflationary  pressures.28
Notes
1. The authors are Visiting Scholar, Harvard Institute  for International  Development  (on
secondment  from The World Bank), and Associate  Professor  of Economics,  Swarthmore
College. The authors are grateful  to Saul Lizondo  for many helpful discussions,  to Paul Collier
for comments  on work in progress, and to Varga  Azad, Jon Isham and David Ko for research
assistance. Views expressed are solely those of the authors.
2.  This paper draws on earlief work of the authors, including  Kaufmann  and O'Connell
(1991) and O'Conmell  (1990,1992).
3.  A more extensive  account  appears in Kaufmann  and O'Connell (1991). See also Green,
Rwegasira and van Arkadie (1980)  and Bevan,  Collier and Gunning  (1987, 1990). Mans
(1994) provides an excellent  overview  of the ERP period.
4.  Before introduction  of the Tanzanian  shilling in 1965, Tanzania  was part of the sterling
area and thus effectively  subject  to exchange  controls  prevailing  in Britain.  In June of 1965,
Tanzania  adopted its own tighter set of controls, exempting  only Kenya and Uganda. These
controls were extended  to Kenya and Uganda  in March of 1971, after having  been temporarily
extended to these countries in the four months following  the Arusha  Declaration  of February
1967. See Mtei (1973).
5.  See Bank of Tanzania,  Economic  Report December  1967  and June 1968, and particularly
the address by E.I.M. Mtei in the June 1968  Economic  Report. While capital flight was
reasonably well contained  in 1967, the adequacy  of exchange  controls was called into question
by intensified  capital flight in 1970-71,  leading to the tightening  of controls referred to above
and to an increase in the enforcement  powers  of the exchange  control authorities  (Mtei
(1973)).
6.  Loxley (1989) provides a thorough  analysis  of the degree to which "the single issue of the
exchange rate dominated  the rift between  Tanzania  and the IMF in the years 1981  to 1983" (p.
32).
7.  The import license data are from the Bank of Tanzania. Ndulu and Hyuha (1989)  give
three reasons why the share of licenses  may underestimate  the true imnport  share: (1) OF
consignments  of under 10,000  Tanzanian  shillings ($50) do not require licenses; (2) the
utilization rate of OF licenses is considerably  higher than that of licenses accompanied  by
official foreign exchange;  and (3) the incentive  to underinvoice  OF imports to avoid customs
duties is much stronger than for officially  financed  imports (which may even be overinvoiced).
8.  Note that of these alternatives, only the direct repatriation  in the form of own-funded
imports is legal. It is still illegal  to acquire or sell foreign  exchange.29
9.  Note that fears of a reversal of the policy have two opposing  effects on the rapidity of the
stock adjustment:  fears of legal reprisals would  slow down the adjustment, and fears of a
reversal of the program would speed  it up.
10. This section  draws on Kaufmann  and O'Connell (1991)  and O'Connell (1990).
11. These effects are the conventional  ones suggested  by the theoretical  literature on parallel
foreign exchange  markets; Lizondo (1990)  and Agenor (1992)  review the literature.
12. Equation (1) is a standard autoregressive  distributed  lag (ADL) specification  with one lag.
Parameter estimates  and t-statistics  from this equation  are numerically  identical to those from
the error-correction model Almz,  = ao + a,Aln(M2/E), + a2AIPD, + a3AREER,  - (1-a7 )1nz,  l
+  a4(M/E)t., + a,IPD,  +  a 6REER,  . The latter specification  accommodates  the possibility
that the variables are non-stationary  and cointegrated,  with cointegration  vector [1, -a4/(1-a 7),  -
a5/(l-a7), -a6/(1-a 7)] (see Banerjee,  et al (1993)).
13. There are potential simultaneity  problems  in the OLS results. First, we assume rational
expectations  and therefore use the actual rate of depreciation  of the parallel exchange rate, in
the interest parity variable. This introduces  an error-in-variables  problem because actual
depreciation  incorporates  a forecast error that is correlated with other variables in the current
period. The real exchange  rate is also jointly endogenous  with the parallel premium. To handle
these problems, we re-estimated  the equations  using instrumental  variables. The IPD variable
becomes statistically  insignificant,  but the results do not otherwise  change  substantially. One
reason for the weaker  results for IPD may be that we do not have good instruments  for the
increase  in expected  depreciation  in 1985-86.
14. We use an average ratio for arabica  and robusta, calculated  by taking the ratio of
payments  to producers for the two types  of coffee  to the total fob export value of the two
types. For data availability  reasons, we use the advance  price for coffee.
15. See for example  Kiguel and Lizondo (1990)  and the references  therein. For a cautionary
note, see Morris (1995).
16.  See also Morris (1995), who independently  derives steady-state  results similar to ours and
reaches the same conclusion  about unification  and money  growth for Uganda in the late 1980s.
His calculations  differ in some  key respects  from ours; in particular, they include credit to the
private sector (assumed  to be zero in our analysis)  and are imbedded in a model in which
unification has no implications  for trade flows. His paper incorporates  a full discussion of the
short-run  dynamics; in his model, the sign of what we call the 'direct monetary effect' of the
premium (see below) affects not only the steady state but also the stability  properties of the
model.
17. Appendix Table I contains a full list of variable names and descriptions.30
18. As emphasized  by Collier and Gunning  (1991), the National  Bank of Commerce,
Tanzania's sole commercial  bank until recently, has essentially  operated as a government
finance agency, channeling  private sector deposits  into loans to the public sector.  Loans to the
private sector constituted  less than 9 percent of commercial  bank assets on average between
1980  and 1988 (Bank of Tanzania,  Economic  and Operations  Report (30 June, 1989), Table
10). Thus the entire stock of broad money  constituted  'outside' money in Tanzania, as implied
by equation (9).
19. Since m refers to broad money, the opportunity  cost of holding m rather thanf should
include domestic  and foreign interest  rates as well as the rate of expected  depreciation, as in
the empirical work reported in section  2. We omit these for notational  convenience.
20.  This is not uncontroversial.  Adam, Ndulu and Sowa (1996) estimate dynamic  money-
demand  equations  for Ghana, Kenya and Tanzania, and conclude on the basis of point
estimates  that Tanzanian  inflation  rates were above the revenue-maximizing  rate for most of
the 1970s and 1980s. But the Tanzanian  results are the weakest  econometrically,  due to the
difficulty  of capturing  the determinants  of the huge fall in velocity associated  with rationing in
the goods market in 1979-84  (see Bevan, Collier and Gunning  (1990)); in fact, for most years,
it is difficult  to reject the null hypothesis'  that the economy  is on the good side of the inflation
tax Laffer curve. See also Easterly, Mauro and Schmidt-Hebbel  (1994) for an argument that
more flexible functional  forms for the money  demand equation  tend to produce significantly
higher revenue-maximizing  inflation  rates for developing  countries.
21.  It is important  to emphasize  that the results of Section  3.1 are based on steady state
comparisons.  Not surprisingly,  unification  is not typically attempted  from a position of steady
state.  One must therefore  use caution in using (8) to work backwards  from the DMEs
estimated  below--which  use the actual  gap between the parallel and official  rate in each year--
to conclusions  about the precise long-run inflationary  impact  of unification.
22.  These assumptions  are approximations  to what would occur under a counterfactual  policy
of exchange  rate unification.  In actual practice, producer prices were determined  on a cost-plus
basis, and maxi-devaluations  were often not passed  along to peasant producers in the form of
increased  prices paid by the marketing  boards. Our assumption  is that pass-through  would
have been substantial  under a determined  policy of exchange-rate  unification, as it has
generally  been in the post-1985  period.
23.  We are assuming  that mq  (Pqm/E)  - 1, the before-tax  markup on world import prices
charged by the import marketing  parastatals, is zero, or equivalently  that the after-tax margin
consists of customs  duties and sales taxes that are already counted in 'r.31
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